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EXPERIENCE OF GOD AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
CREDULITY: A REPLY TO ROWE
Peter Losin

The Principle of Credulity-i.e. that if I have an experience apparently of X then in the
absence of good reasons to think the experience non-veridical I have evidence that X
exists-is an essential premise in many formulations of the argument from religious
experience. I defend this use of the principle against objections offered by William Rowe.
I argue that experiences of God are checkable. and in ways (epistemically) significantly
similar to the ways sensory experiences are checkable. and that treating sensory experiences
as Rowe suggests we treat experiences of God demands wholesale scepticism with regard
to the senses.

Recently William Rowe' has argued that some otherwise plausible versions of
the argument from religious experience--e.g. those of C. D. Broad2 and Richard
Swinburne 3-fail because an essential premise of those versions of the argument
is false. The premise Rowe doubts has been called (by Swinburne) "The Principle
of Credulity," and Rowe casts it as
(a) When subjects have an experience they take to be of x, it is rational
to conclude that they really do experience x unless we have positive
reasons to think their experience delusive. (91)
(a), Rowe argues, is not quite right; and when it is properly recast (as I shall
do shortly) it turns out that its substitute no longer provides the arguer from
religious experience with the support she needs. In what follows I shall examine
and reject Rowe's arguments for these claims. I shall do so by (i) calling attention
to some features of Rowe's treatment of the epistemology of experience of God,
(ii) arguing that these features are, for reasons to be offered, unacceptable, and
(iii) concluding that Rowe has not provided good reasons for rejecting arguments
from religious experience which employ the Principle of Credulity.
The role of (a) in the argument from religious experience is this. First, it is
undoubtedly true that
(b) experiences occur which seem to their subjects to be of God.
This claim, along with (a) and the further claim that
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(c) there are no good reasons for thinking that all or most experiences
which seem to their subjects to be of God are delusive (i.e. non-veridical,
where S's experience E Of object 0 is veridical if and only if (i) 0
exists, (ii) S is (in E) aware of 0, and (iii) 0 is part of the cause of E),

entails
(d) it is rational to believe that at least some experiences which seem
to their subjects to be of God really are experiences of God.
And if (d) is true, then so is
(e) it is rational to believe that God exists. (87)
Rowe is prepared to grant the truth of (b). He concedes that we do not at
present have good independent grounds for thinking that God does not exist,
that He is not present in at least some religious experiences, or that He is not
part of the cause of at least some religious experiences. Nor do we have hood
grounds for thinking that all experiences of God occur under conditions which
are likely to result in delusory experiences (88-89). His complaint is with (a),
which he thinks should be recast as
(a') When subjects have an experience which they take to be of x, and
we know how to discover positive reasons for thinking their experiences
delusive, if such reasons do exist, then it is rational to conclude that
they really do experience x unless we have some positive reason to
think their experiences are delusive. (91)
The underlined clause, Rowe argues, expresses a qualification omitted by Broad
and Swinburne, one which is not met by experience of God. Hence, while (a')
does express an important "basic principle of rationality," it does not apply to
experiences of God. So the argument fails.
It is worth asking what we gain by replacing (a) with (a'). The former, after
all, is simply the claim that (intentional or outer-directed, not necessarily sensory)
experience should be treated as epistemically "innocent until proved guilty"; that
unless it can be shown that an experience of X is not veridical we ought to
suppose that it is-and so that X exists. There are, I suppose, two kinds of
reasons why we might be unable to show that a particular experience was not
veridical. Obviously if the experience is veridical we will be unable to show
that it is not. On the other hand, we might just have no idea how to go about
showing that the experience in question, or the kind of experience of which it
is an instance, is non-veridical. In this case the experience might well be non-veridical, even though no one could find this out or show it to be true. This kind
of epistemic predicament is logically possible. And the rationale behind replacing
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(a) with (a') is that any kind of experience which lands us in a predicament like
this is uncheckable and so epistemically worthless. If experience of X is to
provide good evidence for the claim that X exists it must be possible to tell that
particular experiences of X are non-veridical if they are non-veridical.
All this seems, with some qualifications, true enough. But why think that
experience of God lands us in a predicament like this? Rowe suggests that there
is a problem
concern[ing] the finding of positive reasons for rejecting a particular
experience or type of experience as probably delusive .... Since we
don't know what circumstances make for delusive religious experiences,
and we don't know what the conditions are in which, if satisfied, one
would have the experience of God if there is a God to be experienced,
we cannot really go about the process of determining whether there are
or are not positive reasons for thinking religious experiences delusive
(91 ).

Rowe seems to have the following argument in mind here:

(0 It is not possible to specify conditions such that, were they satisfied,
a subject would have a delusory (non-veridical) experience of God
and
(g) it is not possible to specify conditions such that, were they satisfied,
a subject would have a veridical experience of God;
hence
(h) it is not possible to know or have good reason to believe that
particular experiences of God are veridical or non-veridical, or that
experience of God qua kind of experience is veridical or non-veridical.
Now (0 and (g) must be carefully qualified ifthey are to avoid obvious falsehood. 4
Rowe offers in support of (0 and (g) the claims that "we don't know what bodily
and mental conditions are likely to lead to delusory experiences of God ... [nor]
do we know what the conditions are such that if we satisfy them we will have
an experience of God" (90, emphasis added). In other words, the sorts of conditions with which (0 and (g) are concerned include, but are probably not
exhausted by, the bodily/mental/environmental condition of the subject, including
her attitudes, beliefs and behavior.
I shall return to (0 shortly. It is worth pointing out that many theists would
concede the truth of (g), at least if what is called for is a set of such conditions
which is (causally or logically) sufficient for the occurrence of a veridical experience of God. (Some have even argued that any experience of God for which
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such a set of conditions can or could be specified cannot, for that reason alone,
be a veridical experience of God. I believe this is mistaken, but that it is no part
of my argument.
Suppose it is true that we know of no set of conditions that is in the relevant
sense sufficient for the occurrence of a veridical experience of God. What follows?
This is, after all, exactly what we should expect if theism is true. As George
Mavrodes has observed, 'There is no experience of [God] that occurs apart from
His initiative and purpose; ... every experience of God is a revelation. 5 Yet it
might be supposed that a lack of such knowledge calls into question the possibility
of distinguishing veridical from non-veridical experiences of God. Thus Rowe:
Most existing objects are such that there are conditions which, if satisfied
by the subjects, the experience [of the objects] will follow. This is an
important point we often rely on in judging whether a particular perceptual experience is veridical or delusory . . . . If we know that several
subjects satisfy the conditions but do not have the experience, this will
be grounds for taking a particular subject's putative experience ... as
being delusive rather than veridical. God, however, is not such an
object. God may choose to reveal himself to A but not reveal himself
to B under similar conditions. This means that the failure of a number
of subjects to have an experience of God under conditions similar to
those in which A had an experience need not count against A's experience
being veridical. (90, emphasis added)
Here is an obvious difference between experience of "most existing objects" and
experience of God. It is an epistemically significant difference-there is one
means of checking sensory experiences that is not (or at least not obviously)
available for checking experiences of God. Whether this epistemically significant
difference makes a difference, or the difference Rowe takes it to make, is another
matter.
The objects of sensory experience (which I assume are material objects) are
public and predictable. They are accessible to more than one sensory modality
and to various perceivers at various times. They endure through time and do not
pop out of existence or change their properties without being caused to do so.
They have no prerogatives; whether and when they are experienced is in not
way up to them. (Many living things--e.g. animals-have some such prerogatives, as anyone who has tried to photograph them knows.) It is the publicity
and predictability of their objects that makes it possible for us to distinguish
veridical from non-veridical sensory experiences. As for experience of God (the
argument goes), its object is neither public nor predictable in the relevant sense;
hence (it concludes) it is impossible to distinguish veridical from non-veridical
experiences of God. This may be Rowe's reasoning in inferring (h) from (f) and
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(g); the argument is not new. 6 But the inference is legitimate only if it can be
shown that there are no other means by which veridical experiences of God are
distinguishable from theirnon-veridical counterparts. Are there other such means?
As reasonably competent perceivers we are all familiar with conditions which
make for non-veridical sensory experiences. We learn of others by experiencelearning from our perceptual errors and those of others. Some of these conditions
concern the state of our minds and/or bodies at the time of our experience. Earlier
I suggested that in arguing for (f) Rowe claims that "the problem [presumably
with denying (f)] is that we do not know what bodily and mental conditions are
likely to lead to delusory experiences of God." I suspect we are not totally in
the dark even here, but suppose we grant this claim for the moment. What
follows? If Rowe's claim is true, then probably we lack this knowledge simply
because we do not know what bodily and mental conditions are likely to lead
to any experience of God, veridical or not. This (as Rowe notes) is no reason
to suppose that veridical experiences of God do not or cannot occur; nor does
it make it impossible to distinguish veridical from non-veridical experiences of
God.
What exactly does (f) demand? Means or criteria by which to identify non-veridical experiences of God, criteria which if satisfied give some "positive reason"
for thinking that some particular experience of God to which they apply is
probably non-veridical. I suppose we have criteria which perform this function
in cases of sensory experiences; and we may even appeal to them at times to
sort out veridical perceptions from hallucinations, illusions and other forms of
misperception. What these criteria are is not, I think, entirely clear. And if what
is demanded is a set of such criteria which will suffice with respect to each
particular sensory experience to place it clearly and finally into one or another
perceptual or epistemic category, or that we be able to do this with most of our
sensory experiences at a given time, I suspect very strongly that none of us can
satisfy that demand. Yet we all get along well enough without such a set. Should
we suppose that sensory experience, or the practice of taking sensory experiences
to provide good evidence for claims about "the objects of the senses," or our
ability to distinguish in many cases between a veridical sensory experience and
an illusion or hallucination, is called into epistemic question if such an (in
principle) universally applicable set of such criteria is not available? Or if we
cannot specify such a set? Clearly not. But then why should we so suppose when
dealing with experience of God? Rowe's suggestion seems to be that we have
no idea how to identify non-veridical experiences of God, but that we have some
idea how to identify non-veridical sensory experiences. Is that true?
Well, how do we identify non-veridical sensory experiences? In most cases,
I think, we do so by appealing to other sensory experiences, the assumed veridicality of which, together with other things we know about the object(s) of those
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experienced and/or the conditions under which the experiences occur, entails or
renders likely the non-veridicality of the particular sensory experience(s) in
question. These other sensory experiences can be my own or those of other
perceivers. For instance, if two experiences occur where the veridicality of one
(perhaps in conjunction with other pieces of knowledge) entails the non-veridicality of the other, then at least one of the experiences must be non-veridical.
Which experience should be rejected as non-veridical and which taken to be
veridical depends on a number of complex considerations which I cannot go into
here. But there are two important points to note. First, identifying and dismissing
a particular sensory experience as non-veridical often (if not always) involves
assuming that another sensory experience is veridical. Why? Because without
such an assumption-which need not be groundless or arbitrary-it is hard to
see how we might recognize what it is about the first experience that makes it
non-veridical. For example, it seems on the basis of one experience that there
is a crouching brown bear on the distant hillside, but as another experience (from
a different angle or closer up) makes clear, it is just an oddly-shaped stump. Or
maybe it seems in one experience that the cup on the desk is orange, but another
(in different light) tells me it is really red. Or again, in one experience I might
seem to be aware of a bottle on the table, but another allows me to see that "the
bottle on the table" is really a hologram, that I was not, as I seemed to be,
seeing a bottle on the table. In each of these cases some sensory experience or
other is taken to be veridical, and it is on this basis that they can be dismissed
as non-veridical. This sort of assumption underlies many of the criteria by means
of which we distinguish between veridical and non-veridical sensory experiences.
I see no reason to think that every means at our disposal requires this assumption;
but that we often do make it seems clear enough.
The second thing to notice is this. It is logically possible that all our sensory
experience be non-veridical, and that we be unable to discover this unfortunate
fact. None of us is "compelled by logic" to assume that some sensory experiences
or other are veridical. Of course the number of successful predictions and interactions with our surroundings provides what some would take to be strong evidence
for thinking that what is logically possible is not true; but these successes clearly
do not entail that any particular sensory experience is veridical.
I belabor these points for a simple reason. As Rowe indicates, we do have
some idea how to identify non-veridical sensory experiences. Doing this often
involves assuming that some sensory experience or other is veridical, and arguing
that the veridicality of that experience shows that another experience is not
veridical. There is no proof independent of appeal to (sensory) experience that
this assumption is true. The relevance of these points to the argument from
religious experience is this.
Suppose that by assuming that some experience of God or other is veridical
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we can identify and dismiss other experiences of God as non-veridical. This
assumption, like its counterpart for sensory experience, need not be groundless
or arbitrary. Of course none of us is any more "compelled by logic" to make
this assumption than to make the other. It is logically possible that no veridical
experiences of God occur and that we be unable to discover this unfortunate
fact. This is possible even if God exists. and even if we know that He exists.
I am suggesting it is open to the theist to claim that the kind of reasoning we
typically engage in in checking particular sensory experiences can perform a
similar function in cases of experience of God. We can assume, if only provisionally, "for the sake of the argument," that some experience of God or other is
probably veridical; on this basis other experiences of God can be identified and
dismissed as non-veridical.
It is not hard to anticipate objections to this suggestion. One, which I shall
dismiss summarily, is this. It is unreasonable to assume, even provisionally, that
any particular experience of God is probably veridical unless we have (independent) reasons to think that the experiential kind of which it is an instance is
generally reliable. But we do not have such reasons; hence it is unreasonable to
assume that any particular experience of God is probably veridical. But of course
we do not have similarly independent reasons for thinking that the experiential
kind of which particular sensory experiences are instances is generally reliable;
our conviction that it is reliable is-and, surely, can only be-got by working
"upward" from particular sensory experiences, weeding out those we have "positive reason" to think are non-veridical. This is, I take it, the point of the Principle
of Credulity. To offer this objection is, in effect, to reject the Principle of
Credulity altogether, to treat experiences of God as epistemically "guilty until
proved innocent." Short of the sort of proofs Rowe has concede we do not have,
it is hard to see what might justify this treatment.
Another possible objection is this: to have "positive reasons" for thinking my
experience of seeing the cup on my desk is non-veridical I do not have to appeal
to other experiences of the cup, much less other experiences of seeing the cup.
I can appeal to experiences of other objects, or to experiences of the cup via
other sensory modalities, or to the experiences of other suitably placed perceivers.
On the other hand, to have "positive reasons" of this sort for dismissing an
experience of God as non-veridical I must rely on other experiences of God.
Does this not make a difference?
Yes, it does. But this difference is hardly surprising. After all, there are lots
of objects of visual experience to experience of which we might appeal to check
the reliability of our sight. There is only one God. So it seems quite unfair to
demand that we appeal to experiences of other things to check particular experiences of God.
Further, experiences are grouped as visual (or as aural, or as haptic) according
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to their modality. This fact, together with the fact that many objects of these
kinds of experiences are accessible to more than one sensory modality, makes
it possible for us to use "cross-modal" checking procedures on these experiences.
There may be different modalities by which God is experienced (1 do not know);
but I have written as if experiences were to be grouped as being of God on the
basis of their (apparent) object, not according to their modality (as we might
group "cup-experiences" on the basis of their apparent object, irrespective of
their modality). This being so, there seems to me to be no reason whatever for
expecting that appeal to "cross-modal" checking procedures of the sort that are
available for sensory experiences has a place in checking experiences of God.
It does not follow from this, of course, that they cannot be checked.
On a more positive note, the suggestion that we proceed in cases of experiences
of God as we do in cases of sensory experience has its roots in some of the
theistic mystical tradition. Some mystics, for example, seem interested in finding
ways to distinguish "genuine" (veridical) from "counterfeit" religious experiences. The writings of St. Teresa of Avila evidence a concern on Teresa's part
to find marks or criteria which would enable her to know of a given "locution"
whether it was from God or from the devil. And while Teresa's locutions are
not experiences of God (and are not necessarily products of such experiences),
the sorts of criteria she suggests are still relevant to our concerns.
William Wainwright" has briefly discussed criteria like Teresa's, including
(1) The consequences of the experience must be good for the mystic.
The experience must lead to, produce or reinforce a new life marked
by such virtues as wisdom, charity and humility.
(2) One must consider the effect which the experience has on others.
(3) The depth, profundity, and the "sweetness" (Jonathan Edwards) or
what the mystic says on the basis of his experience count in favor of
the genuineness [i.e. veridicality] of his experience.
(4) We must examine what the mystic says on the basis of his experience
and see whether it agrees or disagrees with orthodox talk.
(5) It will be helpful to determine whether the experience resembles [in
religiously significant ways] other mystical experiences regarded as
paradigmatic by the religious community.
(6) We must also consider the pronouncements of authority. (pp. 86-87)

Wainwright suggests further that
these criteria are similar to the tests which we employ in ordinary
perceptual cases to determine whether an apparent perception of an
object is a genuine [i.e. veridical] perception of it; that is, they are
similar to the tests which take things into account like the position of
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the observer and the condition of his sensory equipment (88),
and that
such criteria have been used [in the Christian (particularly the Catholic)
community] to distinguish the experiences which genuinely involve a
perception of God from those which do not.(86)
Adequate discussion of the role and status of Wainwright's six criteria is a
large task, but I think the following general remark is in order. 8 Each of Wainwright's (1)-(6) can be employed as he suggests they have been employed only
if we are willing to endorse these two claims:
(i) Orthodox theology and ethics are true,
and

U) Genuine or veridical experience of God will conflict with neither
orthodox theology nor ethics.
And accepting (i) and U) is tantamount to granting the veridicality of some
experiences of God (those enshrined in orthodox writings and/or tradition). Other
experiences of God can be identified and dismissed as non-veridical because
they conflict with either the doctrines assumed to be true or the experiences
assumed to be veridical.
Criteria like Wainwright's (1)-(6), then, will be of some use within a religious
tradition (as he claims), but they are of much less use on an intertraditional
basis. Wainwright suggests in several places (pp. 83, 85, 86) that (1)-(6) are
"independent," though he does not make it clear of what they are allegedly
independent. They are, I suppose, or at any rate can be, independent of particular
experiences of God whose veridicality is in question. But if this is to be understood
more strongly, as "independent of commitment to the truth of religious, theological or moral claims central to the traditions in which the experiences being
evaluated occur," Wainwright's suggestion is pretty clearly false. What one
tradition regards as "good consequences for the mystic," or as "depth, profundity
and 'sweetness' ," or as "the pronouncements of authority" may be quite different
from what another tradition regards as such. As Ninian Smart9 put it,
"By their fruits ye shall know them," or more particularly, "By my
fruits shall I know Him." But it should be noted that [these] judgements
are very complex. For fruits are clearly evaluated by reference to certain
ideals and values (such as serenity and zeal) which derive their centrality
from the shape of the religious tradition in question. The Buddhist may
evaluate fruits rather differently from a Christian, a Muslim from a
Hindu. This does not make the appeal [to fruits] quite circular, for two
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reasons: first, a religion needs to show that it at least has the power to
produce the fruits that it values; and second, the fruits tie in with moral
insights which men may have independently of commitment to a particular tradition.

And there may be, in addition to the "moral insights which men may have
independently of commitment to a particular tradition," other ways to evaluate
and assess the religious, theological and moral claims which underlie applications
of Wainwright's criteria. So it may still be possible to develop criteria whichunlike Wainwright's---can be applied on an intertraditional basis. But there is
no guarantee they will much resemble (1)-(6).
Even such intertraditionally-applicable criteria may, like their sensory-experience counterparts, require that we assume, if only provisionally, "for the sake
of the argument," that some experience or other is veridical. Again it needs to
be stressed that such an assumption need not be groundless or arbitrary. Which
particular experience(s) of God should be assumed to be veridical, for example,
is open to argument. In this experience of God is no different from sensory
experience.
As with sensory experience, the assumption that a particular experience of
God is veridical is neither inscrutable nor unoverturnable. We may, despite our
best efforts, come to have reasons for believing ourselves mistaken in dismissing
El because it conflicted with E2. That we can make mistakes like this does not
mean that we cannot go about identifying particular experiences of God as
non-veridical by comparing them to other such experiences. We cannot expect
a proof of the veridicality of any experience (whether of God or of tables and
chairs) unless we are willing to treat such experiences as epistemically "innocent
until proved guilty." A presumption of epistemic guilt, or the assumption that
experiences (whether of God or of material objects) should be assumed to be
non-veridical until proven otherwise, or that particular instances of a given
experiential kind cannot reasonably be assumed to be veridical without proof
that the kind of which they are instances is generally reliable, leads only to
skepticism. Skepticism of this sort with respect to sensory experience is thought
by many to be unreasonable. The argument with which this essay began purports
to show that such (as it were wholesale) skepticism with respect to experience
of God is also unreasonable. If it follows from the arguments I have given that
the success of the argument from religious experience depends in part on the
availability of non-experiential reasons for particular religious beliefs, this seems
to me not the least bit surprising. Experience is often helpful in, but by itself
hardly ever decisive for, assessing scientific theories. So too, it seems, with
experiences of God and theologies.
Much more can be, and needs to be, said on these matters. 10 Even so, it seems
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to me that Rowe's claim that "we don't know how to discover positive reasons
for thinking that religious experiences are delusive, if such reasons do exist," is
false, and that his argument against using the Principle of Credulity when considering experiences of God should be rejected. In the end it strikes me that
Rowe has simply assumed that reasons drawn from experiences of God cannot
themselves be "reasons for thinking that particular experiences of God are delusive," that experiences of God cannot themselves provide a (fallible and provisional) means for the critique of other such experiences. I see no reason to think
that this assumption is true, and good reason to think that, when suitably amended
and applied to sensory experience, it is false. Nor do I see the slightest reason
why we cannot use knowledge or beliefs about God not gleaned from experience
of God to identify and dismiss particular experiences of God as non-veridical.
We proceed in something like this way when sensory experiences are at issue;
it is Swinburne's suggestion that we proceed in similar ways with experience of
God. There are epistemically interesting differences between sensory experience
and experience of God, but they do not lie in the presence or absence, or even
in the character, of criteria for identifying and dismissing instances of each as
non-veridical.
University of Wisconsin-Madison
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